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The meaning of kuriyen is a ring. In ancient times when some tribe halted in a particular place in the form of a ring and the oldest of them camped exactly in the middle of the circle, it was called a kuriyen. At the present time when a hostile force draws near they form themselves into such a figure so that no stranger or enemy may penetrate into the center.

The unwieldy kuriyen, however, tended to break up into smaller groups called ayil consisting of a number of individual kibitkas. The kuriyen provided excellent facilities for defense but was not adapted to the grazing of large herds. This inconvenience was especially felt by the wealthy individuals in the kuriyen who possessed great numbers of horses. Those who were sufficiently powerful through having numerous relatives and supporters to protect their animals therefore separated from the kuriyen and traveled in the smaller ayil group. Valdimirtsov[19] believes that by the thirteenth century the kuriyen manner of nomad economy had been supplanted by the ayil. Thirteenth century travelers do not mention it and Rashid, as quoted above, speaks of it as practised in "ancient times" and in his own day only as a military measure.

The products of pastoral economy were supplemented to a considerable extent by hunting and fishing. Especially important were large collective hunts, highly organized, with numerous beaters.[20] Rubruck says[21] " . . . they get a great part of their victuals by hunting and hawking." At a later period collective hunting was organized on a very great scale.[22]

Manufactures were few but each group had a few specialists, blacksmiths, and carpenters.[23] Trade with the sedentary regions was small but even at a very early time there were foreign merchants among the Mongols, usually Uighurs and Moslems from Central Asia who controlled even the trade between Mongolia and China.[24]

THE GENS

The basic element of Mongol society of the eleventh-thirteenth centuries was the gens, oboġ.[25] All the members of the gens traced their descent from one common ancestor, ebügе.[26] Pozdneev speculates on the probable early form of the gens thus:[27]

The original character of the Mongol clan community was doubtless that of a family which consisted of individuals descending from one another and being in the third or fourth degree of blood relationship, from grandfather down to great-grandchildren inclusively. The head, who was the oldest member of the family, enjoyed general respect, disposed of every single member of his

[19] *Obshchestvennyĭ Stroĭ*, 45–46.
[20] d'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols*, 1: 404–406.
[21] *The Texts and Versions*, 194.
[22] Yule, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, 1:396–97.
[23] Vladimirtsov, *Obshchestvennyĭ Stroĭ*, 43–44.
[24] Bartold, *Turkestan*, 394.
[25] Vladimirtsov, *Obshchestvennyĭ Stroĭ*, 46.
[26] *Sokrovennoe Skazanie*, 29; Rashid-ad-Din, *Sbornik Letopisei*, 1: 148.
[27] Quoted from a manuscript copy of the unpublished third volume of Pozdneev's *Mongolia i Mongoly*, by Riazanovskii, *Customary Law of the Mongol Tribes*, 290.

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642 423 565 on his own initiative punish one of his relatives,[157] yet it is stated in the Great Yassa[158] that: "He ordains that even the senior of the emirs, if he has committed some offense shall give himself up to the messenger sent by the sovereign to punish him. . . ." Riazanovskii however is quoting the fragment of the Yassa from Maqrizi's version[159] which may have been altered somewhat to accord with the latter's idea of the proper attributes of a sovereign.

In any case such centralization of authority did not continue for long. The number of fiefs was constantly increased by the practice of dividing up the ulus of a particular vassal among his descendants, so that the number of princes, vassals and sub-vassals was soon very large.[160] The constant tendency toward branching and subdivision became evident in the ruling gens itself which split up after the death of Chingis into rival and hostile families.[161]

In the process of feudalization it is not clear what was the fate of the minor aristocrats, the leaders and chiefs of groups other than that of the dominant khan. Koz'min[162] states that the aristocracy of the Mongol empire consisted of the aristocrats of all the peoples and tribes of which it was composed. Some families were no doubt annihilated in the wars leading to unification. It seems probable, however,[163] that most of them allied themselves with the rising power and retained immediate control of their people as sub-vassals dependent on the princes of the major fiefs.

[439] The unification of Central Asia under the feudal empire made safe the trade routes and greatly stimulated commerce between the nomads and the settled regions. A variety of products which formerly had been unknown to the Mongols now became available to them.[164] The increase of trade and the appearance of foreign goods did not however greatly [231] alter the pastoral economy. Cattle breeding continued to be the chief occupation of the people but there is evidence that under the feudal régime the use and occupation of pasture land became strictly regulated. The fiefs had definite boundaries and within them the grazing lands of each group were strictly allotted. Carpini observes:[165]

Moreover the emperor of the Tartars hath a wonderful dominion over all his subjects. For no man dare abide in any place unless he hath assigned him to be there. Also he appointeth to his dukes where they shall inhabit. Likewise the dukes assign places unto every millenarie or conductor of a

[157] Vladimirtsov, *Obshchestvennyi Stroi*, 100.
[158] Riazanovskii, *Customary Law of the Mongol Tribes*, 59.
[159] See Silvestre de Sacy, *Chrestomathie arabe*, 2: 160–64.
[160] *Sbornik Letopisei*, 2: 60–63; Berezin, *Ocherk Vnutrennego Ustroistva*, 426; d'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols*, 2: 7.
[161] Courant, *L'Asie centrale*, 35–36.
[162] *K Voprosy o Turetsko-mongol'skom Feodalisme*, 60.
[163] Vladimirtsov, *Obshchestvennyi Stroi*, 103–04.
[164] Bartold, *Turkestan*, 394; Vladimirtsov, *op. cit.*, 44, 129–30; Asfendiarov, *Istoriia Kazakstana*, 63–64; *The Texts and Versions*, 194.
[165] *The Texts and Versions*, 120.

[139 cont.]

175 101 the beginning of the 16th century, and in the second place in the documents of the relations with the [140] Nogais preserved in Moscow in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We find in the latter, under the year 1534, that an envoy of Tsar Ivan Groznoi (the Terrible) named Danila Gubin, then among the Nogais, reported the following: "And the Kazaks, sire, are [721] said to be very strong; and it is said, sire, that they waged war against Teshken (Tashkent); and the son of the king of Teshken is said to have fought against them twice, and the Kazaks defeated them." Likewise Semen Maltsov, sent in 1569 by Tsar Ivan Groznoi among the Nogais, who lived between the Volga and the Yaik /Ural/ rivers, spoke of the attack which "the Kazak hordes of Tsar Aknazar, Tsarevitch Shigai, and Tsarevitch Chelim" (1) made upon their ulus. These accounts, which we

1. See Karamzin's history of the Russian empire, Vol. IX, note 245.

include here only because of their antiquity, tell us nothing about the name of the Kirghiz-Kazaks.

175 648 439 Four years later, however, Ivan resolved to establish political relations with them, persuaded no doubt by the demand of the Stroganovs who had established commercial relations with the Kazak horde. This circumstance obliged the Tsar to protect them and reach out to them by sending a deputy to the chief of the horde. This mission was entrusted to /the Muscovite/ Tretiak /deputy?/ Chebukov (2). But he was taken prisoner near the Kama

2. Ibid., Vol. IX, p. 378.

River in 1573 by the famous Mametkul, nephew of Kuchum, the khan of Siberia, before he arrived at his destination. With the failure of this first attempt to open relations with the Kirghiz-Kazaks, Ivan put off a second attempt till a more favorable time. On May 30, 1774 /1574/, however, he gave the Stroganovs a letter patent, granting them permission to trade with the

[140 cont.]
175 Kirghiz-Kazaks without paying duty (3).
[643
439]

3. See Miller, History of Siberia /Opisanie Sibirskogo Tsarstva.../, p. 87, and Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 661.

The conquest of Siberia which took place not long after brought this people closer to the Russians.

[643] [141] Kuchum, the last khan of Siberia, was himself a Kirghiz-Kazak. When he had made himself master of Isker by force of arms and by putting to death the princes Yediger and [662] Bekbulat, who ruled there (1), it was indispensable that he have

1. See the Chronicles of Siberia; Fisher's History of Siberia /Sibirskaia Istoriia..., 1774/, introduction, article 84; Karamzin's history of the Russian empire, Vol. IX, p. 644.

around him an army made up of his former compatriots. Thus Yermak and the companions of his adventures undoubtedly fought against the real Kazaks, or Kirghiz-Kazaks.

[721 Murtaza, Kuchum's father, was probably quite a powerful 797] sovereign, for he not only gave his son a year to conquer the land, but also sent him additional mullahs to spread the Moslem religion in Siberia (2).

2. See Miller's History of Siberia and Fisher's History of Siberia, introduction, articles 86 and 87.

175 After Yermak, Kuchum, as we know, was driven out of
648 Isker by Seidak, who later fell into the hands of the Russians.
662 Uraz Mehmet, the tsarevitch or sultan of the Kazaks and nephew of Tevkel, who called himself khan of the Kazaks and

[142 cont.]
175 his sons, the Tsarevitch or Sultan Hussein, as hostage in his
648 place (2).
630

2. For this letter, see the packet [envoi] preserved in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This letter was conveyed by Tevkel's ambassador, who was accompanied by Veliamin-Stepanov, interpreter for the Tatar language.

What sort of news Stepanov may have brought to the Tsar upon his return from the horde is unknown. It is only known that his journey produced no political advantage for Russia, that neither Tevkel nor his successors were Russian subjects until the 18th century, and that they neither served Russia nor rendered her
[121] any kind of help. On the contrary, they attacked her new colonies in Siberia.

175 One must believe, however, that those who lived on the
648 frontiers of the new Russian territorial possessions must have had
● 439 frequent relations with them, as did our merchants, at that time, and that they acquired accurate knowledge about their country. For in the book Bolshoi Chertezh /The Great Description, which according to the well-founded evidence of Karamzin must have been written during the reign of Tsar Fedor Ivanovich (3) /1584-

3. Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. X, p. 259.

1598/, many dwelling places which existed on the lands of the Kazak horde are spoken of in great detail.

131 [143] As this book is rare, we believe it is not irrelevant to quote that which concerns the steppes of the Kirghiz-Kazaks:

"And from the Sea of Khvalymsk (Caspian) to the Blue Sea (Aral), toward the east of summer, it is 250 versts /266 km./.

"And along the Blue Sea to the mouth of the Syr /Darya River/ it is 280 versts /299 km./, and across, by the Blue Sea,

[156 cont.]
a power over the Great Horde which he did not possess, to make himself important in the eyes of the Russian court and thus to acquire influence over the entire Kazak nation.

Empress Anna's letter patent of July 10, 1734 proves Abulkhair's deceit. First of all, this letter is presented in the name of various beys and elders and not in the name of Djulbars, who was then commander of the entire Great Horde, as is known from several documents and Rychkov's History of Orenburg. Furthermore, in the letter patent it says: "Our subject Abulkhair Khan has reported to us as a faithful subject that he has already accepted you among the ranks of our subjects, and for this purpose he has sent your deputies Aralbai and Arasgeldy-Batyr to our court." These words are founded upon Abulkhair's writings and the oral declarations made by his son, but neither the one nor the other promoted anything but falsehoods. On the one hand, it is recognized that Abulkhair, who lived a long distance from the Great Horde, could never have any influence upon it. On the other hand, we see that this horde never took an oath of loyalty to Russia and was not counted among her subjects. In the third place, it must be noted that the head of the Orenburg expedition, Kirilov, who received this letter patent at the moment of his departure from Petersburg, did not even send it to its destination. It is probable that he felt this move to be indecorous when he arrived at the border and was able to appreciate the truth of the circumstances mentioned in this document.

The second proposal to admit the Kazaks of the Great Horde as Russian subjects is much more probable than the first, though little more sincere. This was made in 1738, not by a man claiming to be chief of the Great Horde but by Djulbars, the true and legitimate chief of this horde. Having learned of the founding of a Russian city at the mouth of the Ori River and the opening of trade with the Kazaks of the Middle and the Little Hordes, he sent to ask for the same benefits, and to help [157] attain his end, he proposed making not only his own people Russian subjects, but also the neighboring nations, if it was

[157 cont.]
desired to protect and facilitate their trade at Orenburg. The conditions suggested by Djulbars show that he was thinking less about submission than of profiting from the advantages of trade relations, and experience justified this assumption. Djulbars did not swear his loyalty and never even came to the border. The letter patent prepared in Petersburg on July 17, 1739 as a result of his promises still rests today in the archives of the Orenburg Border Commission.

Later the Russian government received several more proposals related to the submission of the Great Horde, but these were made by sultans or individual tribal chiefs whose authority did not extend over the entire horde and who desired the gifts which the Russian sovereigns made to their new subjects more than the protection of the empire.

Besides, if the Great Horde had decided to submit with the Little Horde in 1730, or with its Khan Djulbars in 1738, it would have found great obstacles to the fulfillment of its desire. The contiguity of the Dzungars and the distance of the Great Horde from the Russian frontier would have stopped it. Galdan Tsyren or Cheren, Kungtaidji of the Dzungars, would never have allowed his Kazak neighbors to take such a step, for he sustained a hereditary hatred against them and never allowed an opportunity to escape for oppressing them or avenging the wrongs done to [721] his forefathers. The union of the Middle and the Little Hordes with Russia persuaded him to reduce the Great Horde to a position where it could not follow the example of the others; he attacked it, defeated it, and subjugated it.

This conquest, however, like all victories won over nomadic peoples, could not be a permanent one. Even though the Russian employees who were then (1) in the [158] Kazak steppes said

1. See Lt. Gladyshev's journal preserved in Orenburg at the Border Commission.

that Galdan's new subjects gave him a korsak /steppe fox/ pelt apiece as a sign of their submission, nevertheless misfortune could not destroy their love nor habit of freedom.

[158 cont.]
×648 could not destroy their love nor habit of freedom.

When they realized that it was impossible for them to keep their old regions on Lake Balkash, they drew back to the Tsuya
[726] and Sara-Su [Sary-Su?] rivers. Later when they united their forces, they attacked Tashkent and Turkestan and laid them waste, as well as many other cities and villages belonging to those two states, and they acquired so much power over the residents of Tashkent that they forced them to choose their khans from the horde.

Shubai, Arslanov, and Mansur, residents of the former province of Vyatka, came from Tashkent to Orenburg in 1742 (1)

1. See the file for 1742 in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

and told how the khan named above ruled in Tashkent until 1739,
[651] and that a powerful old Kazak named Tiul Biu shared his authority, and every year they levied a tribute on the city. Later Djulbars was killed, but Tiul Biu continued to rule after him for a time and to levy tribute. A certain Kussiak Bek, a tributary subject of Galdan Tsyren, and perhaps his lieutenant, put an end to the power of Tiul Biu.

He was the ruler of Tashkent while Shubai and Mansur were there, but the Dzungarian sovereign received the tribute he took from the people. According to our travelers, under Kussiak Bek the Kazaks had no more influence over Tashkent, but they re-
[726] strained the environs of this city to such a degree that it was as though under a state of permanent siege. They cultivated land under its walls, seized the neighboring forests, and at the slightest dissatisfaction they seized the residents of the city and the merchants who came to trade with them.

×648 Turkestan too was for a certain time in a [159] similar
721 position, although the Kazaks did not hinder the Dzungars from
● [439] trading there. As for the small towns between Tashkent and Turkestan, the Kazaks who conquered them during this period kept them until the beginning of the present [19th] century.

[176 cont.]

[348] spoken and who had been promoted to the rank of colonel for his discreet conduct during his stay with the hordes and for having induced Abulkhair's subjects to swear loyalty.

Here are the most outstanding articles of the instructions presented to Kirilov as he was about to depart. He was enjoined to do the following:

1. To build a city and a fort at the mouth of the Ori River, and to seek to attract residents to it;

2. To send the letters patent which he had for Abulkhair, for Shemiaka, khan of the Middle Horde, for the tribal chiefs of the Great Horde, and for the khan of the Karakalpaks;

3. To invite the khans and the elders or tribal chiefs of all the hordes to come to him;

4. To require the swearing of the oath from the Great and the Middle Hordes;

5. To send Sultan Erali back to his father under a good escort;

[177]

6. To maintain the obedience of the Kazaks by gentle means and gifts or by force and terror, depending on the circumstances;

[311] 7. In case Abulkhair or other khans or ordinary Kazaks wished to pasture their herds near the new city, to assign them lands for this purpose. And in case the khans wished to have [343] houses, either as temporary lodgings or to live in, to build them under the walls of the city according to their custom, and even to give them permission to build mosques, but to maintain a guard there for a service of honor and for supervision;

8. To designate the Ural River as the border and to guard it so that no Kazak might cross it without permission;

[292] 9. To establish a tribunal for litigations, composed of Russian officers and Kazaks chosen from among the most distinguished men, such as the sons of khans and of other sultans or of elders, and to see that each was judged in this tribunal according to the customs of his country;

[439] 10. After the founding of the city and after conferring with Abulkhair, to profit by the first good opportunity to send a caravan

[177 cont.]
with goods to the realm of Bukhara and further, if possible, and likewise to seek to attract merchants from different parts of Asia to come to Russia;

11. To send geodetic specialists with the first caravan to examine places and draw maps;

12. To look for mines as much as possible and to examine the place where, according to Abulkhair, there was supposed to be gold;

13. To seek to establish a port on the Aral Sea and to hold armed vessels there, and to build a few longboats on the Yaik (Ural) River at first to this end, and after having taken them down, to keep them ready at all times with all their gear; and when the city is built and the relations with the Kazaks and Karakalpaks are more stable, to transport [178] these vessels thus dismounted to the Aral Sea during the winter, with the consent of Abulkhair and the Kazak princes, and there to assemble them and arm them with artillery;

14. To buy Kazak horses for the cavalry at favorable moments;

15. To be active in the discovery, exploitation, and sale of metals (excepting gold and silver) which are to be found in the Kazak steppes, according to the principles of trade without losing time in observing forms.

In order to make it easier for Kirilov to execute these orders, everyone everywhere was directed to give him all the help possible.

He was also entrusted with complementary diplomatic instructions, whose ends were:

1. To watch the Bashkirs, among whom there had been frequent disturbances up to that time;

2. To watch the Kazaks likewise;

3. If one group or the other came to an uprising, to use one people against the other in order to spare the Russian troops;

4. To seek to acquire precise information promptly about contiguous peoples;

5. Above all to watch the behavior of the Dzungars, to seek means of putting an end to their raids upon the Siberian colonies, and to divert them from levying tributes on the peoples

[182 cont.]

[148] This attempt was fruitless, however. Although some detachments did suffer from their attacks, Kirilov himself reached his goal, and on August 15, 1735, he laid the foundations of the new city on what is now the site of the fortress of Orsk.

As soon as the fortifications began to rise, and troops and artillery had been introduced, Sultan Niaz, kinsman of Abulkhair Khan, was sent to the horde with several elders to announce to the Khan that his request had been fulfilled, in other words, that Orenburg had been built on the site which he had chosen, and also to invite him to present himself with all the chiefs of the hordes in the spring of 1736 in the new city to confer with Kirilov. At this same time the merchants of Tashkent who had come into [139] Russia with goods were sent back. In order to induce them to come and trade in the new city, various assistance was given them and many gifts, and they were informed of the privileges accorded to Orenburg.

[69] Moreover the revolt of the Bashkirs far from being put down grew more and more violent, and constant attacks were made on the supplies of our armies. Count Rumiantsev, commander in chief of the armies and father of the famous Zadunaiskii (1),

1. This means "beyond the Danube" and was a nickname given the famous Rumiantsev after his Turkish campaign. Note of [French] translator.

was appointed to force them to submission. Meanwhile Kirilov, who was constantly occupied with him about Bashkir matters, had no time to make closer contacts with the Kazaks.

[183] These facts indicated to him that another fortified line from this river to Samara, independent of the line of fortresses on the Yaik, was indispensable in order to guarantee the safety of Russia's relations with her Yaik colonies. As soon as he saw a chance, Kirilov endeavored to establish both the one and the other. From his reports to the imperial cabinet (1)

1. See the report of October 27, 1736.

[184 cont.]
×648 its aim, for Kirilov, who had spent the winter of 1736 to 1737 drawing up plans, which he had firmly resolved to carry out in the spring, for the regulation of Kazak matters, died in the month of April of the same year.

It is especially unfortunate that he did not have time to carry out two acts: first, to meet with the Khan and tribal chiefs who were soon to arrive in Orenburg at his invitation, and second, to send to Tashkent a caravan which had been lead by Tashkent
● [439] merchants who had come to Kazan by way of Orenburg in 1736. Elton, a naval officer in the British service, was to accompany this caravan as a merchant (1), in order to gather information on

1. This same Elton later went into the service of Shah Nadir and was the cause of diplomatic explanations between the Russian and English ministers.

the principality of Tashkent, and especially to explore the Aral Sea, on which it was being proposed to establish a flotilla, as was said earlier. Elton's order had already been written, as was found among Kirilov's papers after his death; but it remained without consequence, as did the plan to erect a city at the mouth of the Syr /Darya/, on the Aral Sea, which it was planned at first to populate with criminals who had been condemned to exile (2).

2. There was an ukase on this subject of February 11, 1736.

The importance of the matters entrusted to Kirilov and their anticipated results required that a man be chosen to replace him who was both intelligent and energetic, and this was the case. Tatishchev, famous for his history of Russia, was appointed as chief of the Kirghiz [-Kazak] expedition, or, as they said then, the Orenburg expedition. This appointment was made known at once to the Kazak Middle and Little Hordes by two letters patent in the name of the Empress. One was immediately delivered to Abulkhair, but the other, addressed to the deceased Khan [185] Shemiaka,

[188 cont.]

x 648 3. As greater proof of his submission, in 1739 Abulkhair expressed the wish to send his spouse, the Khaness Papai, to the court, but the reason for this plan was curiosity, no doubt, and the hope of receiving rich presents.

[189] In gratitude for all the favors which he had received, the Khan proposed and solemnly obligated himself to defend and protect Russian caravans passing across the Kazak steppes. In accordance with these assurances, Tatishchev sent the first caravan [439] to Tashkent just at this time, and a part of the merchandise belonged to the crown. Lieutenant Muller was appointed head of [654] this caravan, and a geodetic officer was assigned to him to make geographic sketches.

This caravan passed through the Little and Middle Hordes [579] successfully but was pillaged in the Great Horde, two days from Tashkent.

[431] Before the Khan departed for the steppes, rich gifts were distributed in the name of the Empress, not only to him, but to the sultans, elders, and even to the ordinary Kazaks of his suite.

At this time the Middle Horde had not yet elected a khan to replace Shemiaka, but it was ruled by two khans, Abul Mahmet and Ablai, whom Tatishchev had invited to come to meetings in Orenburg at the same time as Shemiaka [sic]. Neither of them came, however, and for this reason an officer was sent to them to find out their attitudes toward Russia and to discover what reasons had prevented their coming to Orenburg. This envoy returned at the end of August, 1738, bringing with him certain elders who informed Tatishchev that Abul Mahmet and Ablai had not been able to respond to his invitation because of the distance of their auls [nomad villages], which were on the Irtysh /River/, but that they would not fail to come the following spring and that they would swear an oath of loyalty.

x 648 This meeting did not take place, however, for Tatishchev 439 left for Petersburg at the beginning of 1739. The first news learned 579 by his successor, Prince Urusov, who arrived in Orenburg only at the end of the summer, was that two Russian caravans, which had left Orenburg shortly before, had been pillaged practically upon

[189 cont.]
our border by Kazaks of the Little Horde. Such were the first proofs of the [190] protection of our trade in Asia promised by Khan Abulkhair.

A second proof of the impotence of the princes, or rather the Kazak chiefs, was seen in 1740 when Karasakal, chief of the Bashkir rebels, fled beyond the Yaik with his accomplices. The Khan and the sultans absolutely refused to arrest these deserters.

All these circumstances, and particularly the pillage of the caravans, caused Abulkhair to be embarrassed about appearing in Orenburg in 1740 for a meeting with Prince Urusov, and he sent excuses that he was ill and too far away.

To these two reasons, which he gave openly, a third must be added, which was secret. He knew that at this time Abul Mahmet, new khan of the Middle Horde, was expected in Orenburg. This man was his enemy and one over whom he had pre-eminence, and he was afraid of seeing the other treated as his equal. But in order to avoid reproaches and dispel suspicions, he sent the Sultans Nurali and Erali, his sons, to Prince Urusov.

On this occasion they were received with all the honors which had been shown their father two years before. The Kazaks who accompanied them were also treated with special regard. Seventy-five elders dined at the table of the chief [Prince Urusov?], and food and beer were distributed to the persons of their suite outdoors.

Although Sultan Nurali was at that time a grown-up man, yet his father had given him as a preceptor during his trip to Russia a man, Batyr Djanibek, who was universally esteemed among the Kazaks and known for his wit. He was received in Orenburg practically as an equal of the sultans, and with them received rich gifts at the first meeting in the name of the Russian government.

The first visit of the Khan's sons to Prince Urusov was only a ceremonial visit and an exchange of pleasantries. At the second meeting the affairs of the horde were discussed. [191] They explained that the first caravan sent by Tatishchev was pillaged by the Great Horde, over which they had not the slightest influence.

[192 cont.]
their seal on the leaves on which the oath was written in lieu of signature. In imitation of them, 128 Kazak elders of the Middle Horde swore the oath in a neighboring tent, and the people took the oath outdoors. This ceremony was followed by a feast, the firing of artillery, etc.

On the following day the Khan, accompanied by Ablai, returned to Orenburg to discuss Kazak matters. During this meeting Prince Urusov particularly insisted that they should escort the caravans coming from Russia or returning there, that they should surrender the goods seized by the Great Horde from Muller's caravan, and that they should put an end to the disagreements existing between the Kazaks and the Volga Kalmuks. They were unable to satisfy this last request because they belonged to a people which was more accustomed to pillage than to obeying its chiefs. Furthermore, the Kalmuks had suffered more from the Little Horde, which was their closest neighbor. We will add, by way of proof, that in this same year, 1740, Abulkhair himself sent nearly 3,000 Kazaks to ravage the Kalmuk uluses.

It was impossible to satisfy the demand for escorts for the caravans. Ablai, who was more powerful than Abul Mahmet, could have assumed this obligation, but it was not to the advantage of the people or the chiefs, since no matter how high a price the escort received, it could not counterbalance the benefits accruing to the Kazaks from seizing the goods.

Two days after the first meeting with the chiefs of the Middle Horde, Prince Urusov invited them, together with the sons of Abulkhair, to come to see the maneuvers of the infantry and artillery. Abul Mahmet and Ablai admired the exercises [193] and especially the fireworks which were displayed in their honor. But in order to avoid meeting Abul Mahmet, Nurali and Erali not only failed to appear in response to the invitation which they had received, but left Orenburg the same day without taking leave of Prince Urusov. It was later learned that the real reason for this hasty departure was the fear of being kept as hostages in Russia at the instigation of Abul Mahmet.

The Khan and the sultans left Orenburg giving every sign of submission and devotion to the Russian government. But the events

[202 cont.]
x648 [726] their attacks on the borders while he, fearing to come near the Ural River, found a way in the heart of his deserts to avenge himself upon the Russians who had retained his son. First he robbed a caravan going from Astrakhan to Khiva, which had the misfortune to pass through his lands. Later he stopped the journey of Lieutenant Gladyshev, who was going from Orenburg to the Karakalpaks. Nor was he satisfied with robbing the Karakalpak envoys who had come from St. Petersburg and were accompanying Gladyshev, but he even seized the imperial letter which was entrusted to them (1).

[739]

1. It is worthy of note that in his journal Gladyshev speaks of having found an English merchant named Djake [Jack?] with the Little Horde in 1742, and that he bought various articles from him in order to present them to the Karakalpaks as gifts.

x648 721 This conduct strengthened the Russian government in their intent to punish the Kazaks through the Volga Kalmuks, inasmuch as the quarrels of these two peoples and their raids upon each other had become more intense at this time. Consequently, on April 24, 1744, Dunduk Dash, deputy of the Kalmuk khanate was presented with a letter patent commanding him to collect as many armed Kalmuks as possible, who would receive powder and shot at Astrakhan, would march against the Kazaks, and would act under the orders of the governor of Orenburg, Nepluev. By way of recompense, the Kalmuks were promised all the plunder they could take from the Kazaks, except for elders and their children. This letter, out of precaution as much as through confidence in [203] Nepluev, was sent to him directly instead of to the horde, so that he could use it if it were indispensable. It is not known what he thought of such a decisive measure, but this letter remained at Orenburg, and the original is still preserved in the archives of the Border Commission.

[214 cont.]

x648 [664] obtain auxiliary troops in order to take vengeance against Barak for the assassination of his father. In his second request he asked that those Kazaks whom he described as men of evil intent and harmful to Russia should be arrested on the borders.

x648 662 Barak or his successors and their followers would have failed to escape the vengeance of Abulkhair's sons, no doubt, if they had received support in troops from Russia. But Nurali's exploits would not have ended there. He had planned to use the Russian troops against all his enemies, and especially against those princes of the Middle Horde who did not honor him and whom he wished to annihilate in order to subject their descent lines and tribes to his brothers, and then he would have made himself sole khan of both the Middle and the Little Hordes.

The second request, to arrest the Kazaks of evil intent on the Russian borders, also tended to the same end. He represented it as a necessary measure for the security of Russia, but ambition was its true motive.

On the one hand, the execution of this demand would have been really useful and indispensable for the Russians, for it would have made it possible to deliver into the hands of justice at least a part of the brigands, and, by adding to the power of the Khan, ● [439] it would have given him new means of acting upon his people. But on the other hand, it could have been the source of an endless number of injustices and would have abolished the commercial exchange which was then just beginning to be established between the Russians and the Kazaks.

For these reasons, the Khan's first request was formally refused, and it was promised that the second would be considered.

x648 [765] Upon his departure from Orenburg, Nurali, in the name of his brothers and his mother Papai, voiced the desire to have some great monument on his father's grave and requested 1,000 workers for 15 days for this end (1). This wish was nothing more than the

[114]

1. All the conversations which the khans had with the border commanders [215] were written down in journals which have been

[218 cont.]
The news of her death arrived in Orenburg before Tevkelev had been able to have a conference with Nurali (2), and prevented

[I-39]

2. While waiting for Tevkelev, Nepleuv had delegated an officer interpreter to Nurali and his mother to advise them and to acquire information about the Dzungarian ambassadors. This interpreter was ordered to present to the Khan, as a rare thing, 10 chetverts of flour and as much [219] groats. The principal aim of this gift was to induce the Kazaks to take wheat from the Russians in exchange for their merchandise.

the latter from being told of the orders given to begin [219] his father's tomb immediately and the intention to receive Chingis as hostage. These measures had become unnecessary in a time of calm.

[I-61] Being in ignorance of the indulgent disposition of the government and in order to conform to previous demands, Nurali in 1749 presented his legitimate brother Adil as hostage to replace Sultan Aichuvak, and in 1750 he exchanged this brother for his own son Pirali, who was only five years old.

[I-62] At this time Sultan Batyr, the father of Kaip, then khan of Khiva, and the son of the Kaip who had been the sultan of the Kazaks, opened relations with the authorities in Orenburg. As was already said above, his father Kaip had written in 1718 to Peter the Great. Batyr had inherited his father's hatred for Abulkhair and had never recognized his authority, and for this reason had had no relations with Russia for a long time. But when a part of the Little Horde proclaimed him khan, the equal of Nurali, and when his son had become the sovereign of Khiva, he had still less respect for Abulkhair's son and hoped that Russia would have the same consideration for him as for his rival.

However, at the beginning of his relations with Orenburg, he had not decided to request that he be recognized as khan. In

[219 cont.] In 1750 he only requested the Orenburg authorities, through his envoys, that the Russian caravans proceeding to Khiva and the dominion of Bukhara should pass through his pasture lands, and he undertook to escort them and defend them. In order to give this proposal greater force, his son, Khan Kaip, sent a deputy charged with bearing assurances of peace and amity and also the request that the caravans be sent by way of the auls of his father. This wish of Batyr and his son could not be fulfilled because it tended to do an obvious wrong to Nurali, who in his capacity as a vassal of Russia and a khan recognized by her was [220] in charge of protecting Russian trade in the steppes between the Ural River and the Syr [Darya] and had already undertaken this task.

It is true that one could scarcely count upon his efforts, but the Sultan Batyr's promises presented still less security in view of his distance from the Russian border. For this reason he was answered that the obligation of escorting the caravans across the lands of the Kazak Little Horde was under the jurisdiction of Nurali, that he could help in this, and finally that he was to live on good terms with Nurali if he wished to enjoy Russian protection.

The envoy from Khiva received a reply from Nepluev which contained nothing decisive but was, nevertheless, very honest.

These measures, without regard to their justice, were based on the benefits to Russia. She had to protect and even augment the power of the khans she had installed or recognized, for their weakness would not produce or even promise any use for her. At that time the Kazak hordes had been numbered among her subjects for nearly 20 years. For nearly 20 years she had been losing money in keeping them peaceful, presenting gifts to the sultans and elders, building forts and maintaining troops. Yet, in spite of all these sacrifices, she had been unable during this interval to protect her borders from pillage, nor even to find a way of rescuing her native subjects from the fetters of a people who had submitted to Russia voluntarily. Abulkhair's excuses as to his lack of power, expressed rather rarely because of his vanity, were regarded as subterfuges, as much because of his knavish character as of his

[222 cont.]
acquaintance of the Russians. Sultan Kuchak, who had been proclaimed khan by several tribes, had not been confirmed by Russia and had not even sought her protection. The good graces of the Dzungarian prince were more necessary to him, as they were to all [223] the sultans of the Middle Horde. Only Abla failed to renounce the protection of Russia, in spite of his secret relations with the Dzungars, for most of his subjects lived near the Russian border, and he sensed how useful it was to him to remain on good terms with Russia.

Since he had to look out for the advantages of trade with the Russians in addition to the interests of his security, he requested that a market be opened in the fort of Troitsk, saying that Orenburg was too far away for him and particularly for most of his subjects to go there.

Batyr Djanibek, who had moved away from Orenburg after Abulkhair's death, asked for the same thing. The fulfillment of this request was equally advantageous to the Russian government, giving it greater means of surveillance over the Great Horde, and consequently a trade market was opened at Troitsk in 1750.

Before his death Galdan Tsyren had become reconciled with the Kazaks and seemed to wish to attach them to him more by kindness and good deeds than by terror. But his son had an entirely different view of the matter and renewed his attacks. The Middle Horde especially suffered greatly in 1751 near the Ulu Mountains. The considerable loss of men taken prisoner by the Dzungars made it necessary for most of this horde to come closer to the Russian border and almost to mix with the Little Horde, after reaching the Ori River and the Mugodzhar Hills.

In 1752 Russia's relations with Nurali Khan had less to do with Kazak matters than with the expansion of caravan trade with Khiva, the dominion of Bukhara, and Tashkent, and across these lands with the other states of Central Asia, even to the Indies, which were regarded as the source of all riches. Since the Indies were not far from the Kazak steppes, it was wished to make the first step across this country to reach that [224] region. This is why Nurali's help, if he were to give it in good faith, would have been of great importance to Russia in connection with trade.

[225 cont.]

x648 In 1753 the angry Nurali directed that the first caravan
[579 from Khiva which went to Russia or returned from there was to be
439] pillaged. His orders were carried out. At once Kazaks of the
● Alimul descent line of the Karakitin tribe pillaged many Khivan and Turkomen merchants on the Sagiz, who were coming with goods under the escort of Kazaks of the same Alimul descent line but of the Chiklin tribe. Nepluev sent a civil official to the horde expressly to persuade the Khan to call the bandits to account,
[662 deprive them of the goods, and return them to their owners.
681] Nurali replied decisively that the pillage had taken place by his order because Sultan Batyr, not content with disobeying him, was also seeking to arouse the Middle Horde against him, and that Batyr in agreement with his son was requiring the Khiva caravans to travel only by way of his own auls. Moreover, in order to justify himself and with the aim of arousing Russia against Khiva, he wrote to Orenburg that Kaip and Barak (or Batyr) were preparing to attack the Russian border, and in that case he advised that the land of Khiva be conquered and promised to take it in a few days if he were sent the assistance of 10,000 Russian troops with artillery.

[579 His goal in proposing his services was easy to guess, and
577] thus Nepluev and Tevkelev did not listen to his insinuations but repeated the demand for the return of the stolen merchandise of the robbed caravan and reproached him for conduct unbecoming to a khan. Their entreaties would have been useless if the interpreter charged with delivering them had not caused Nurali to hope, on instruction from Nepluev, that if he gave satisfaction to the [226] merchants he would gain the right to request the stipend from the government which had been assigned to him but had not been given all this time. This produced a greater effect than all the advice, and he busied himself at once with making his subjects give up the goods.

[661] Kaip, the khan of Khiva, acted quite differently. While the Russian government was causing the restitution to his subjects of what they had lost, this khan had a Russian caravan halted in Khiva, and in spite of the demands of the Orenburg authorities,

[226 cont.]
he did not release it until nearly a year had passed. When this caravan returned to Orenburg in 1754, an envoy of Kaip himself accompanied it as well as a Russian officer who had been in Khiva. The latter declared that he had met Sultan Erali on his way and that this prince had begged him to report to Nepluev that he and his brothers were ready to attack Khiva to avenge the insults of Sultan Batyr and his son, and that he planned to join the discontented subjects of Kaip, to put him to death, to seize his place, and to release the Russian prisoners who were then in Khiva. He asked only that in case he were unsuccessful Russia would promise to ransom him if he himself were taken.

To everyone's great astonishment the envoy from Khiva, instead of carrying out his master's orders, complained to the Russian government of the avidity and injustices of the Khan. He described the evils he made the people suffer, and in the name of all the Uzbeks, the people [race] to whom he belonged, he demanded help in order to dethrone the Khan.

Although this demand provided Russia with an opportunity to punish the Khivans for their perfidy and their prince for his insolence the year before in detaining a caravan from Orenburg, nevertheless the government then thought the conquest of Khiva more difficult than it was useful. Moreover Erali's pledge provided hope for acquiring some influence over this land without bloodshed. Consequently the government refused to acquiesce to the proposal of the Khivan envoy, who [227] had solicited help in overthrowing Kaip, but did not forbid him to ask help from the Kazak princes (1). Khan Nurali and Sultan Erali were

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of April 2, 1755.

permitted to march against Khiva and to seize it if luck was on their side. Also it was decided to grant Erali his ransom if he happened to be captured on this expedition.

Russia would certainly have gained an enormous advantage commercially if Abulkhair's sons had carried out their plan and

[227 cont.]
had been successful in seizing Khiva. But unfortunately they did not even start toward the realization of the end proposed by Erali. The reason for this inaction was no doubt the insufficiency of the troops they could have opposed to the forces of Kaip and his father together.

Prince Maksiutov, the captain sent at that time from Orenburg to the Little Horde, wrote in his reports that Nurali Khan and his brothers were preparing to march against Khiva and convoked an assembly of the people who approved of the plan. But when a khoja, who as a kind of saint had been asked for a blessing for the success of the expedition, forbade them to make war against the Khivans, they obeyed him. The Middle Horde then suffered from the last exertions of the Dzungars. In 1754 they found themselves so harassed by the latter that a large number of Kazaks of this horde asked the government to allow them to pass their women and children over the Russian lines if they could not be allowed this permission themselves. Some of them went so far as to ask that they be granted lands on the border, where they promised to engage in agriculture and to build villages.

Such a guard would have been too unsafe, and it would even have been dangerous to allow the wives and children of the Kazaks to enter the forts. Thus the governor of Siberia was directed to pay no attention to [228] such demands (1). Shortly

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 317, 1755.

after this, part of the Middle Horde once more asked to be received under the protection of the forts. This time, because of the remonstrances of Nepluev and also because it wished to treat the Kazaks favorably, the government allowed them to live as nomads near the Uisk line and directed that in case they were attacked they were to be allowed to cross within the Russian border, but with hostages taken from them to guarantee their peacefulness.

This favor, which was granted them at the end of 1756,

[240 cont.]

[648] not ceased their thieving and laid waste the border provinces as before. But the departure of the Kazaks would have been very [439] injurious in regard to trade, and it was to prevent this that Russia wished to keep her semisavage subjects in their old habitat.

[662 643] It was essential to keep Sultan Ablai well disposed toward Russia, for he was acquiring more influence over his subjects every day and was becoming more fitted than anyone else to drive them in some high undertaking. A large part of the Middle Horde had already given him the title of khan. He himself in his relations with the Russian authorities did not yet give himself more than the title of sultan. But his power and his rank as a Chinese prince, to which Ch'ien Lung had elevated him, made it easier for him to change his title and to adopt that of supreme chief of all the Middle Horde, without any permission or cooperation on the part of Russia. This manner of behavior would have been contrary to the dignity of the empire, for the Middle Horde was among its subjects. But it was impossible to prevent such an event by [241] prohibiting it, and it would have been too injurious to take revenge by force of arms. It was therefore decided to induce Ablai by kindness and favors to himself request his investiture with the title of khan in the name of his people. In anticipation of this request, he was assigned an annual stipend, and an officer was sent to him charged with subtly showing him the path by which he could acquire the position of khan and to inform him that in order to reach this goal it was necessary that he give his son as hostage, following the example of Nurali.

Against all expectations Ablai received the Russian envoy in a very unfriendly manner and refused to present his son. In addition, it was learned soon after from a reliable source that Abul Mahmet, who had been created the khan of the Middle Horde by Russia, was still alive, and therefore the elevation of a new khan was put off to another time.

[726] In 1760 the Kirghiz-Kazaks of the Middle Horde attacked the savage Kirgiz, or Buruts, and inflicted great losses upon them.

[727] Later they caused a disturbance in a sector of the new conquests of China and took several prisoners there. The Chinese demanded

[246 cont.]

[648] [72] This same year 200 tents of Turkmen, who had been living with the Kalmuks for a long time, fled beyond the Yaik /Ural River/, and after the Kazaks had allowed to enter their territories they enslaved the fugitives and divided them among themselves.

[167] [439] [579] During the first years of the reign of Catherine, Russia's relations with the Kazaks were directed more than ever toward the two ends which she had in view: the first, to establish settlements in the two hordes; the second, to insure the inviolability of the caravans.

[361] For the first point, it was wished to revive the plan to build a strong city at the mouth of the Emba and to build a house there for Khan Nurali. But since his subjects feared to see the Russians in the middle of their steppes it was ordered to build a camp in the form of a redoubt instead of a fortress, to shelter the fishermen who came into this region. And in order to keep this establishment from even scaring the nomads, it was ordered that a market be opened where they could provide themselves with wheat from the crown at the lowest price. It was also wished to teach [177] them to [247] mow hay and to build sheds for their animals and dwellings for themselves if they asked for it. Likewise orders were repeated to the border authorities to build sheds for the animals and houses for those Kazaks who wished it on the Irtysh River and beyond the Ural. Taking advantage of the consent of a small number of Kazaks, the Siberian authorities, who had the advantage of living in good relations with certain Kazaks, were ordered to build an entire village on the small Kolchakly River and to obtain for it every imaginable advantage. In a word, the government tried every possible means to imbue its nomadic subjects with a taste for sedentary life. But they always had, and still have today, an invincible aversion to it, either as a result of their [181] nomadic life or for fear of losing their savage liberty, which they value above every kind of possession.

[439] [579] For the second goal, the security of trade, it was necessary to seek new means, for 30 years of experience had proven that neither the khans nor the sultans could offer the caravans a sure and inviolable protection over the entire extent of their territories.

[247 cont.]

[648] The weakness of their power and their frequent dissensions are still [439 579] almost unsurmountable obstacles to the security of trade, and even to this day they make it impossible to make the caravan routes used by the merchants of Tashkent, Kokand, or their eastern neighbors perfectly safe. As for communications with the Bukharans and the Khivans, Russia has another route, that of the Caspian Sea. Before the hordes acknowledged themselves vassals of the empire, it was the only route which served Russia for its trade with Persia and Central Asia. Catherine was not slow to turn her attention to this matter, and having rejected useless hopes from the promises of the Kazak princes, which were both empty and pompous, she wished [248] to concentrate all the commercial relations of her subjects with Khiva and the dominion of Bukhara in Astrakhan. But this plan was not carried out, on the one hand because the Asiatics did not find it advantageous for them, and [316] on the other hand because it threatened Orenburg, Troitsk, and all the copper and iron mines established in their environs with complete ruin.

[439] Nevertheless the intentions of the Russian government with regard to trade with Central Asia did not prevent it from supporting the exchange of goods with the Kazaks in every way possible. [712] At first this was only done at Orenburg, while later it was begun at Troitsk and, in 1764, at the fort of Semipalatinsk. This last fort was designated for this purpose on the entreaty of Sultan Abulfenz, son of the famous khan, Abul Mahmet, and brother of Polat, khan of Turkestan. In the Middle Horde he was in command of the powerful Naiman descent group. He was independent, but camped in the former lands of the Dzungars, which had made him seek the protection of the emperor of China. [439] Having never sworn loyalty to Russia nor had relations with her, he was able, without deception, to send a respectable elder to the authorities of the Siberian border to plead that his subjects have the liberty of trading with the Russians in Semipalatinsk. And this was immediately granted to him.

[342 177] At this time Sultan Ablai requested the Russian government to send him ten tillers of the soil to teach his Kazaks agriculture. [661] Catherine gave orders to satisfy his request, after having taken

[259 cont.]
×648 of the punishment inflicted upon it by the Russian troops the year
[727] before. The Middle Horde had been causing suspicion for some time because the rumor had spread that Ablai, profiting from the recent troubles of the Bashkirs, had sent several messengers to them to induce them to move under his domination. But investigations proved that these rumors were false.

During the months of June and October of this same year, several elders and sultans who were independent of Ablai sent deputies to the commander of the Siberian line to propose that
[661] they be recognized as Russian subjects. Among these was the son of Khan Abul Mahmet, Abulfeis, who had asked that he be assigned an annual stipend. Ablai's son and nephew asked for the same thing.

Empress Catherine received the report and replied in a rescript of May 25, 1776 in the name of the governor of Orenburg, as the principal administrator of Kazak matters, that the individual proposals made by the Kazaks of the Middle Horde to be received as subjects were founded on nothing more than the desire to obtain gifts. It was added that they were completely useless, for the entire horde had been recognized as subjects of the empire since the reign of Empress Anna, and that if such demands were satisfied this would only produce new demands. Furtheremore it was said that the fixing of annual stipends would become an obligation for the government and would accustom the Kazaks to regard as a duty that which was only the effect of the government's indulgence, and consequently it would be much better to conciliate them with gifts which were not fixed. These concepts showed a profound knowledge of the character of the Kazaks; they were the fruit of 46 years experience, from 1730 to 1776.

×648 Irnazar Maksiutov, the Bukharan ambassador, who came to
439 [260] Russia in 1775, revived the idea of building a Russian city in the Kazak steppe at the mouth of the Emba in the conferences he had on the means of removing the trade of caravans between Russia and Bukhara from all danger. The Russian government showed itself ready to carry out the plan (1), but it remained without

1. As a result of the ukase given on this

[260 cont.]

subject on December 17, 1775, the geodetic specialist Vasiliev drew a map of the environs of the Emba and the rivers which flowed into it.

execution, as had all the others which had been made previously.

[721] It can be seen in the reports from the governor of Orenburg, Reinsdorf, to the Empress in the months of March and April, 1776 that the Little Horde had once more begun acts of hostility against Russia, and although after the Russian troops entered the steppes in 1774, the border authorities had been forbidden to send troops beyond the Ural, yet Khan Nurali himself had asked for armed assistance to bring his restless subjects to their senses.

[662] Sultan Ablai, on the contrary, was then becoming more powerful, older, and wilier from day to day. Having had more experience than any of the contemporary Kazak princes and being known for his intelligence, dreaded by his subjects, and distinguished for his ties with the empress of Russia and the emperor of China (2) /sic/,

2. The best known among them was Sultan Dair, son of Barak, who complained to the governor of Orenburg that Ablai had unjustly usurped the title of khan.

he had every possible right to the post of chief of the Middle Horde. Sure of his ability, he knew how to attract followers by his importance and his prudent behavior. He threatened his enemies with his power and acknowledged himself now a subject of Russia and now that of China (3), depending on the occasion,

3. Some Kazaks who came within our borders stated that Ablai spoke Chinese.

being in fact a completely independent sovereign. One can notice this especially after the year 1771, when he made less

[643] effort to conserve appearances of an external submission to Russia, and having become less hypocritical, he openly took the title of khan.

[267 cont.]
x 648 721 726 we will say that his raids and those of his partisans forced the Russians to send two [268] detachments of troops beyond the Ural. The first was composed of 2,760 men and was sent from the Ural toward the source of the Emba. The second, of 1,250 Cossacks, was sent from Uralik /Uralsk?/ toward the mouth of that same river. Snow prevented these troops from acting according to their instructions, but nevertheless the expedition was not entirely useless. They seized 213 women and children, for [727] whose ransom a large number of Russians who had been captured earlier were given up.

x 648 ● 439 712 It will be understood that such conditions were not of a sort to make caravan trade flourish between Russia and Central Asia. For a long time the khans' promises to protect the caravans had not been believed. Long experience had made their weakness known. Nor could it be hoped to restore the brigands to reason for a long period of time. For this reason means were sought to establish the safety of trade by force of arms. It was proposed, to this end, to build forts on the Emba and Temir rivers and defenses on the route from these two points to Iletsk [Sol-Iletsk], or to set up only one fortification on Mangyshlak [Peninsula] on the Caspian Sea and to send the caravans from Guryev by sea. Thus from Orenburg to Guryev they could follow the route along the Nizhne-Uralsk line in complete safety.

One of these plans was not carried out, partly because of the extraordinary difficulties which had to be surmounted and partly because the old trade routes were very advantageous to the Khivans and Bukharans, for although the new ones would have been safer, they still would not have been entirely safe from attack.

x 648 692 The Orenburg border commission controlled matters pertaining to the Kazaks, or rather it examined all the relations of the government with this people, but it could not study the individual disputes which arose between the residents on the two sides of the line. The [269] Empress, in order to remedy this, conceived the plan of establishing a tribunal in whose operations the Kazaks would take the same part as the Russians, and which would serve them as a school of justice. This at least was what

[273 cont.]
privileges which the latter held by birth, Syrym proposed that the position of khan was unnecessary and sought to make up for his own lack of illustrious ancestors by personal merit. Under his influence the national assembly swore the oath of loyalty to the empress of Russia without the least opposition, promised to stop its raids, and to apply its efforts to maintain peace in the horde and to obey all the commands of the Russian government. But it demanded as a guarantee of Russia's protection, that Abulkhair's descendants, including Nurali himself, should forever lose the right to be khans of the Little Horde.

Can one fail to recognize Syrym's ambition in this demand? Nurali and his brothers were poor leaders because of their weakness, not because of their cruelty. Thus they could not have incurred the hatred of the entire horde to the point of forcing it to consider their removal from power as necessary to their peace. Then the government even went so far as to say that it was no longer up to it to change the course of affairs, because the idea of abolishing the position of khan had long since been adopted. Moreover, the peaceful inclinations of the national assembly and Syrym's clever actions seemed favorable to the re-establishment of calm within the horde.

[274] Actually, the year 1786 stood out among all other years, especially the two preceding, because of the calm which reigned during its span and the more frequent relations between the Russians and the Kazaks. It is true that there were also several disturbances springing from the abasement of all the sultans, especially the descendants of Abulkhair. Nevertheless this does not prevent our notice of the fact that the greatest exchanges of [439] livestock (1) on the line took place in 1786 and 1787, and in the

1. See the table on the quantity of livestock exchanged by the Kazaks with the Russians from 1745 to 1820 that we have included in the statistical article [pp. 426 to 427, not translated].

[274 cont.]
course of these two years fewer prisoners were taken on the border than in the 13 years from 1782 to 1794 (2). Likewise,

2. As proof, we include here the following table for these 13 years. Along the line which extends from the fort of Zverinogolovsk to Guryev, the Kazaks took 34 prisoners in 1782.

21	"	" 1783
176	"	" 1784
175	"	" 1785
12	"	" 1786
2	"	" 1787
43	"	" 1788
53	"	" 1789
90	"	" 1790
34	"	" 1791
40	"	" 1792
60	"	" 1793
42	"	" 1794

in 1786 his subjects released quite a large number of Russians from slavery, up to the time Nurali was banished from the horde after Ufa had been fixed as his place of exile and the detention of his brother Aichuvak at Uralsk. That same year 45,000 tents spent the winter inside the Russian borders and crossed the Ural River again in the spring without permitting the slightest infraction of the peace.

The first effects of the new system of administration of the Little Horde could not fail to be pleasing [275] both to the Empress, who ardently desired to establish order among the Kazaks, and to the supreme commander of the border, who was approaching the goal indicated to him by the advice of his sovereign and who saw the possibility of pleasing her by insuring the prosperity of an entire people. Occupied with these thoughts,

[295 cont.]

[648] In 1793, Lieutenant General Strandman, commandant of the Siberian line, sent a body of troops into the Kazak steppes which liberated the Turkmen prisoners. Vali was so distressed at this loss that he complained to the Empress. The only satisfaction he received was the permission to come to St. Petersburg to explain all his needs and his requests, and he did not take advantage of this because he was afraid to leave the horde. Finally, after the death of his brother Chingis, he announced that all his complaints had been made on the advice of his brother, and he reconciled himself with the local authorities and promised to help them in all matters.

This move, however, was not a proof of perfect devotion to Russia, for he wished to maintain his relations with China, following the example of his father, and to this end he sent his son to the emperor of China in the winter of 1794-95 to bear witness to his submission. At the same time he continued to oppress the tribal chiefs, except those who were attached to Russia. The result of this behavior was that in January, 1795 two sultans, 19 elders, 43,360 of their subjects and 79,000 other Kazaks submitted a petition to the Empress asking to be delivered from Vali's rule and to be accepted under the direct dominion of the Russian government.

The execution of this demand was too difficult and promised no advantage to Russia. In the meantime Vali showed signs of repentance and raised the hope that he would become reconciled with the malcontents, and therefore things remained in their original state.

The part of the horde which lived along the Verkhne-Uralsk line and had the Bashkirs for neighbors, as we said above, in 1795 gave the most [296] convincing proof of the truth of our reflections about the causes which made the Middle Horde more peaceful than the Little Horde. At the time when the tribes and divisions of the Kazaks along the border were peacefully carrying on trade with the Russians on the Siberian line, it made several raids in the districts of Chelyabinsk and Verkhne-Uralsk, laid waste several villages then, took many prisoners, and carried off quite a large number of

[313 cont.]

Chapter V. On the Possibility of Making the Kirghiz-Kazaks Adopt Sedentary Customs.

631 The division of territory, of which we spoke in relation to the
[636 camps of each tribe, might cause one to believe it possible to
[311 establish each tribe or each descent line on the land it occupies,
177] in fixed positions, since it recalls to a certain point, the idea of territorial property. But this idea vanishes when one comes to consider the nature of the country and the moral inclinations of its inhabitants.

233 The care of the herds and their propagation is, as has been said before, the favorite and cherished occupation of the Kazaks, as well as the source of all their wealth. In order to sustain this
[311 branch of economy in the flourishing state in which it is at
181] present, vast pasture lands are indispensable, and considering
579 the inclination of nomadic peoples for brigandage, these pastures cannot have fixed limits, and in addition, they are divided into two classes, summer and winter pastures. An open plain, smooth and rich [314] in fodder, is excellent for the livestock in summer, but during the winter confining hills are necessary, especially for the ewes, to protect them from the winds and storms, and also sand which absorbs moisture and on which, therefore, the snow
[222 remains for a shorter time, as well as reeds and heather, which
372] provide good nourishment for the camels and good fuel for the shepherds.

311 This is why every tribe has its winter and summer pastures,
233 the former usually in the south. Thus the Baganaly and the Naimans, who spend the summer on the Ishim or the Turgai rivers, withdraw in winter to the Kuvan-Darya, while the Djappas people leave the market of Troitsk in November to go toward the shores of the Syr [Darya]. The same could be said for many others.
361 It is clear from this that the Kazaks must either have two different
●439 camps according to the seasons or reduce the number of their animals. In this last case they would do harm not only to themselves but also to their neighbors, whose trade relations with them have the sole purpose of exchanging livestock.

S /190 cont./
291 Altai Kazak /Cossack/ women often wear a man's costume in the summer because it is more convenient to work in (to ride horseback) in the mountains.

S The food and drink of the Kazak /Cossack/ are simple.
262 His dinner consists of one dish -- meat soup (usually mutton)
272 and milk. Those living along the Irtysh eat a great deal of fish
273 (in various forms). Groats /kasha/ are rare, while potatoes and vegetables are quite common. Brick tea plays an important role in the diet of the Kazak /Cossack/, and no family celebration passes without it or without vodka. They drink their tea strong, taking a bite of sugar with it. Their bread is mostly of wheat (rye bread is very rare). Vodka is widely used. In the Altai they make an intoxicating beer of honey, which takes the place of wine.

S We have already spoken of the occupations of the Kazak
241 /Cossack/. Service duties do not leave much time for the
461 development of the productive forces of the Kazak /Cossack/
464 population. Since agriculture demands a great expenditure of
438 labor, it does not enjoy his favor, and if it is carried on, it is
439 almost always with hired workers -- Kirghiz /Kazak/. Trade
K- in livestock and goods, or even in bread which has been bought,
[464] is preferred as an easier and more profitable occupation, thanks
[439] to such undemanding and compliant buyers as the Kirghiz /Kazak/. The Kazak /Cossacks/ of the Kokchetav uyezd (former peasants) are considered the best grain farmers.

S There are many livestock raisers along the Irtysh and in
233 the steppe uyezds (Akmolinsk and Atbasar), where the natural
S conditions are also propitious. Some of them have tens and
[471] even hundreds of thousands in capital from this occupation. The
S Irtysh (and a few of the Kokchetav) Kazak /Cossacks/ engage
226 in fishing, but they do this in a quite primitive fashion and it does not constitute a substantive business, but only an auxiliary one. Fishing with nets, as an industry, exists only on Lake
S Zaisan, where small fishing families are gathering. Beekeeping
231 is carried on by the Kazak /Cossacks/ in the Altai, but it is poorly set up and does not yield such good results as among the peasants living next to them.

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"kumiss pubs" /kumysnye kabachki/). In Akmolinsk, Uralsk, and other steppe towns populated in part by Kirghiz /Kazak/, there are several such kumiss vending places, where it is possible to obtain a large cup (3-4 times the size of a teacup) of good kumiss for 2-3 kopeks.

[758]
The nourishing and stimulating qualities of kumiss are well-known /213/ also to the local Russian population, not to speak of the patients visiting the healing places (Borovoye, Shchuch'e, Bayan-Aul, Ul'binskoye, and others) and summer houses, who drink kumiss on the advice of their doctors. The Russian popu-
[439]
[435]
lation of the surrounding towns drink a great quantity of it in summer, for example, in Omsk, where in this season incoming Kirghiz /Kazak/ open a trade in kumiss (30-50 kopeks per
[273]
chetvert). The Kirghiz /Kazak/ make an intoxicating beverage called "araka" from kumiss (by distillation), but it does not yet
272
have a wide distribution. The Kirghiz /Kazak/ also like to
[273]
drink tea with sugar, especially brick tea. They do not drink
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vodka and wine. Russian baked bread is customary among the
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Kirghiz /Kazak/ near towns.

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It was said above that the main occupation of the Kirghiz /Kazak/, being a nomadic people, is livestock raising, but in recent times agriculture has also begun to spread. Here we shall only discuss the domestic occupations of the Kirghiz /Kazak/.

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

A Kirghiz /Kazak/ nomad village near Omsk. (From a photograph by Bebenin.)